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This paper provides new estimates of the global gains from multilateral trade reform and 
their distribution among developing countries in the presence of trade preferences. 
Particular attention is given to agriculture, as farmers constitute the poorest households in 
developing countries but the most assisted in rich countries. The latest GTAP database 
(Version 6.05) and the LINKAGE model of the global economy are employed to examine 
the impact first of current merchandise trade barriers and agricultural subsidies, and then 
of possible reform outcomes from the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda. The results 
suggest moving to free global merchandise trade would boost real incomes in Sub-
Saharan Africa proportionately more than in other developing countries or high-income 
countries, despite a terms of trade loss in parts of that region. Net farm incomes would 
rise substantially in that and other developing country regions, thereby alleviating rural 
poverty. A Doha partial liberalization could move the world some way towards those 
desirable outcomes, but more so the more developing countries themselves cut applied 
tariffs, particularly on agricultural imports. 
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  The aims of this paper are threefold: to summarize the costs of current merchandise trade 
distortions to developing and other economies; to examine some scenarios that might emerge as 
part of an eventual Doha Development Agenda agreement consistent with the 2005 Hong Kong 
(China) Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2005), particularly with respect to agriculture; and to 
draw out implications for the strategies developing countries might adopt in the WTO’s Doha 
round of multilateral trade negotiations.   
  More specifically, the paper shows what the world economy could look like in 2015 
without and with a successful conclusion to Doha, how far Doha could take the world towards 
where it would be in the absence of all distortions to merchandise trade, and what contribution 
could be made by the various elements of a Doha package. For present purposes we make use of 
a recursive model of the global economy known as LINKAGE (see van der Mensbrugghe 2005a), 
which has formed the basis for the World Bank’s standard decade-long projections of the global 
economy and its earlier trade analysis (e.g., World Bank 2002, 2004). We also use the latest 
version (6.05) of the GTAP Database, which includes the tariff preferences enjoyed by many 
developing countries (see www.gtap.org). The distinction is made in our results between effects 
on developing countries as compared with more advanced economies, but in doing so it is 
necessary to take into account not only the World Bank’s  classification of economies based on 
income level but also the self-nominated one practiced in the WTO (in which even economies as 
advanced as Hong Kong (China), Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China) claim 
developing country status and so are eligible for Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) 
including lesser tariff cuts and longer phase-in periods than what is eventually agreed for 
developed countries under Doha).  
Our analysis suggests most of the potential gains from multilateral reform are from 





would be little real agricultural reform globally as a result of the Doha round – especially by 
developing countries – unless WTO Members are willing to make very substantial cuts to their 
bound tariff rates and domestic farm subsidy commitments. . We therefore explore the effects of 
a more ambitious agricultural reform package, and of developing countries participating more 
fully in the Doha round rather than invoking SDT to avoid reform. In both respects we show how 
much closer the world could get to exploiting the full benefits of trade if these more-ambitious 
reform commitments were to be made and implemented over the next decade. If WTO members 
insist on classifying even just a small number of farm products as “Sensitive” and subject to 
lesser tariff cuts, however, the gains from agricultural reform could be greatly diminished – and 
even disappear for developing countries. 
The paper begins with an overview of the key elements of a prospective Doha agreement, 
consistent with the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2005), focusing especially on the 
agricultural elements. It then describes the model of the global economy to be used to analyze 
the consequences of such an agreement, and of alternative more-ambitious reforms including a 
move to complete free trade (which provides a helpful benchmark). The estimates of protection 
and subsidy rates for each region are a crucial part of the data in the global model, and so they 
are examined before turning to the key results of the simulations. After discussing some 
qualifications, the paper concludes by drawing out implications for developing countries. 
 
Key elements of a prospective Doha agreement 
 
To what extent are trade and subsidy reform commitments likely to emerge from the 
Doha round? In addressing that question, it needs to be kept in mind from the outset that WTO 
trade negotiators are seeking agreement on reductions not to the applied tariffs and subsidies but 
rather to members’ legally bound import tariffs, agricultural export subsidies and bound 
commitments on domestic support to farmers. These bound rates are higher than applied rates in 
nearly all countries, but especially so in most developing countries, reducing the impact of cuts 
on market access.  
The Doha round was launched at the WTO Trade Ministerial meeting in Doha in late 
2001, but the following Ministerial meeting, in Cancún in September 2003, ended with acrimony 





abundantly clear that further progress would not be possible without a commitment by developed 
countries to significantly lower their agricultural subsidies (including importantly for cotton, 
despite its relatively minor role in developed country agriculture – see Sumner 2006).  The so-
called July Framework (WTO 2004) and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2005) 
reiterate the importance of keeping development at the heart of the Doha agenda, and  
particularly stress agricultural reform as key to that. In their Annexes, these documents provide 
guidance as to how a Doha agreement might be structured, with frameworks for establishing 
modalities for agriculture and for non-agricultural market access, as well as providing 
recommendations for trade in services.  
 
Agricultural market access 
Jean, Laborde and Martin (2006) examine the consequences of different tariff-cutting 
formulae, bearing in mind agricultural tariff rate quotas (TRQs), the prevalence of preferences 
for developing countries as described in Bouet, Fontagné and Jean (2005), the need to 
accommodate “Sensitive” and “Special” farm products, and the Special and Differential 
Treatment outlined in the July Framework. For present purposes, tariff cutting is implemented at 
the 6-digit HS level of commodity disaggregation and involves a detailed comparison of each 
country's bound tariff, which is what negotiations focus on, with the applied MFN tariff on a 
given bilateral trade flow, which is what affects economic outcomes. The gap between bound 
and applied MFN tariffs is the so-called binding overhang, and can blunt significantly the impact 
of any negotiated outcome – so much so that, in some Doha scenarios, some countries are not 
required to change their applied tariffs at all. Once the detailed tariff analysis was conducted, the 
results were aggregated up to the GTAP and Linkage models’ regional and sectoral levels. Note 
that the applied tariff cuts vary not only by sector, but also by trading partner – and may involve 
smaller or no cuts on imports from those developing countries currently enjoying non-reciprocal 
preferential access to richer countries’ markets (Hoekman and Ozden 2005).  
Jean et al. (2006) evaluated the consequences for 2001 applied rates of different 
approaches to liberalization, and particularly different degrees of top-down progressivity in the 
bound tariff cuts, as well as different degrees to which developing countries participate in 
reform. They looked first at a proposal similar to the Harbinson progressive reduction formula 





for tariffs above 90 percent and 60% for tariffs within the 15-90 percent bracket.
1 Developing 
country tariff cuts also follow the progressive-tax-style tiered formula, but for them Harbinson 
suggested four rather than three brackets, with inflexion points placed at tariff levels of 20, 60 
and 120 percent, so as to be consistent with Harbinson’s criterion of cutting by an average of 
25%, 30%, 40% and 45%, respectively, in those four brackets. 
That set of tariff cuts, it turns out, would lead to very little import liberalization, because 
bound tariffs in many countries exceed applied rates by such large margins. As a result, Jean et 
al. focused on a set of reforms that involve cuts in applied agricultural protection rates that are at 
least 10 percentage points greater, namely a 45%, 70% and 75% bound rate cutting rule for 
developed countries and a 35%, 40%, 50% and 60% cutting rule for developing countries
2. 
These cuts are within the (wide) range proposed by key WTO members in the lead up to the 
Ministerial.  
Jean et al. then examine, and we model, the consequences of: 
•  allowing lesser tariff cuts for self-nominated “Sensitive” farm products assuming 
countries would take into account the importance of the commodity, the height of the 
tariff, and the gap between the tariff binding and the applied rate in deciding which 
products to grant such treatment, comparing situations in which countries are allowed to 
treat 2 percent of agricultural and food tariff lines as sensitive and subject to just a 15 
percent tariff cut;  
•  including “Special” agricultural products just for developing countries, by adding another 
2 percent of agricultural tariff lines as  subject to just a 15 percent tariff cut; and 
•  adding a tariff cap of 200 percent, consistent with the suggestion in paragraph 30 of the 
Framework agreement that the role of a tariff cap be explored. 
 
Agricultural domestic support 
Reductions in domestic support have been a particular concern of developing countries. 
This reflects the fact that the developed countries are the major providers of such assistance, and 
                                                 
1   This approach provides cuts in average tariffs -- without the discontinuities created by the proportional cuts 
involved in the Harbinson formula -- that are more or less comparable with those generated by Harbinson’s 
proportional reductions of 25%, 30% and 60%, because the larger cuts on higher tariffs apply only on the 
portion of the tariff above 15 or 90 percent, respectively. 





many developing countries are concerned about the ability of their producers to compete with 
developed country farmers receiving large amounts of domestic support from their governments. 
While the marked asymmetry between industrial and developing countries is a concern, there is 
evidence, from Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2004), Hertel and Keeney (2006) and Anderson 
and Valenzuela (2005), that the benefits to developing countries from reductions in developed-
country domestic support may be substantially smaller than the potential gains from reductions 
in market access barriers. Nonetheless, disciplining such support is crucial not just to prevent 
policy reversals but also to ensure that when tariffs are lowered, import protection is not simply 
replaced by equally or more-distorting domestic measures. 
The Framework agreement and the Ministerial Declaration propose tiered reductions in 
the total bound Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), with larger reductions by Members with 
higher initial AMS levels.  It turns out that extraordinarily large reductions in bound AMS are 
required before any reductions in actual support would occur. If all countries with AMS 
notifications above 20 percent of the value of production cut their bound protection by 75%, and 
all others by 60%, only four members would have to cut applied rates as of 2001: the US by 
28%, Norway by 18%, the EU15 by 16%, and Australia by 10%.  
 
Agricultural export subsidies 
Export subsidies for non-farm goods are outlawed in the WTO, so eliminating farm 
export subsidies would simply be bringing agriculture into line with other goods. The empirical 
analyses summarized in Hertel and Keeney (2006) and Anderson and Valenzuela (2005) show 
that those subsidies contribute only a small part of the welfare cost of agricultural support 
programs. That is true even when implicit subsidies in the form of food aid and export credits are 
included. A phase-out by 2013 of both explicit and implicit forms of farm export subsidies, as 
agreed at the Hong Kong Ministerial, should therefore be a politically feasible component of a 
comprehensive Doha agreement. Their elimination in isolation could harm a few food-importing 
and aid-dependent developing countries, but the poor net buyers of food in those countries can be 






Non-agricultural market access 
Negotiations in the area of non-agricultural tariffs have been lagging those on farm 
products. There has been a clear indication that developing countries wish to make lesser tariff 
cuts than developed countries and that least-developed countries expect to not have to make any 
cuts. A Doha round is unlikely to involve all non-agricultural bound tariffs being cut by more 
than 50 percent, so we assume there will be that degree of cut by developed countries and 33 
percent by developing countries other than least-developed ones (from whom no cuts are being 
demanded). However, since that bound cut may lead to very little reduction in applied rates by 
developing countries, given their high tariff bindings relative to their applied tariffs, a more 
ambitious scenario involves them committing to more reform (in return for which they could 
seek reciprocity in the form of further cuts in developed countries’ agricultural and textiles 
tariffs). The most optimistic possibility considered is that developing (including least developed) 
countries agree to cut non-agricultural bound tariffs as much as developed countries (that is, by 
the 50 percent we assume).   
 
Services trade 
WTO members have been very slow in coming forward with Doha proposals to reform 
services trade. At this stage it seems likely that, as with the Uruguay Round, countries will make 
few meaningful commitments to genuinely open up their services sectors as part of the Doha 
round. For that reason, and because services trade is less-adequately represented in trade models 
than is goods trade, we have not included any reductions in this sector in our analysis – despite 
the fact that, as indicated in Hertel and Keeney (2006), gains from services reform could well be 
enormous, including for developing countries.   
 
The global LINKAGE model for assessing effects of future trade reform 
 
For this analysis we use a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model known as 
LINKAGE. It is a relatively straightforward CGE model but with some characteristics that 
distinguish it from standard comparative static models such as the GTAP model (described in 
Hertel 1997). A key difference is that it is recursive, so while it starts with 2001 as its base year it 





to take a decade or more to be fully implemented, because the structure of the world economy 
will be quite different in 2015 than it was in 2001. Economic expansion in the model is driven by 
exogenous population and labor supply growth, savings-dependent capital accumulation, and 
exogenous labor-augmenting technological progress (as used in the World Bank’s Global 
Economic Prospects report in 2004 and as detailed in van der Mensbrugghe 2005a). In any given 
year, factor stocks are fixed. Producers minimize costs subject to constant returns to scale 
production technology, consumers maximize utility, and all markets – including for unskilled 
and skilled labor, both of which are intersectorally mobile – are cleared with flexible prices. Also 
consistent with our focus on long-run adjustment to reform, the aggregate supply of farm land is 
defined by an overall upward sloping supply function, with land-abundant countries having a 
higher land supply elasticity; and that land is allocated across agricultural activities using a 
constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. There are three types of production 
structures. Crop sectors reflect the substitution possibility between extensive and intensive 
farming; livestock sectors reflect the substitution possibility between pasture and intensive 
feeding; and all other sectors reflect standard capital/labor substitution. There is a single 
representative household per modeled region, allocating income to consumption using the 
extended linear expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure in 
which aggregate import demand for each sector’s product is the outcome of allocating domestic 
absorption between domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import demand is 
allocated across source countries to determine the bilateral trade flows. 
There are various sources of protection in the model. The most important involves 
bilateral import tariffs. There are also bilateral export subsidies. Domestically, there are subsidies 
only in agriculture, where they apply to intermediate goods, outputs, and payments to capital and 
land. 
Household consumption and savings are represented by the Extended Linear Expenditure 
System, which provides a rigorous framework for modeling consumption/savings decisions and 
allocation of consumption spending across commodities (Lluch 1973). Government fiscal 





fiscal objective being met by changing the level of lump sum taxes on households.
3 This implies 
that losses of tariff revenues are replaced by higher direct taxes on households. The current 
account balance is fixed, primarily for convenience
4 in this recursive- model but also consistent 
with the Feldstein-Horioka finding of limited international capital mobility (Feldstein and 
Horioka 1980; Ventura 2003).  Finally, investment is driven by savings.  With fixed public and 
foreign saving, investment is determined by changes in the savings behavior of households and  
changes in the unit cost of investment.  The model only solves for relative prices, with the 
numéraire, or price anchor, being the export price index of manufactured exports from high-
income countries.  
The newest version of the LINKAGE model, Version 6.0, is based on the latest release of 
the GTAP dataset, Release 6.05. Compared with Version 5 of the GTAP dataset, Version 6 has a 
2001 base year instead of 1997, updated national and trade data and, importantly, a new source 
for the protection data (see www.gtap.org for details). The new protection data come from a joint 
CEPII (Paris)/ITC (Geneva) project. The product of this joint effort, known as MAcMaps, is a 
HS6 tariff level detailed database on bilateral protection that integrates trade preferences, 
specific and compound tariffs and a partial evaluation of non-tariff barriers such as tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs).
5 The new GTAP database has lower tariffs than the previous database. This is 
because of the inclusion of bilateral trade preferences, as well as the major reforms between 1997 
and 2001 such as continued implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements, and China’s 
WTO accession which alone contributed to the ratio of global exports plus imports to GDP rising 
from 44 to 46 percent over those four years. 
The version of the LINKAGE model used for this study is comprised of a 27-region, 25-
sector aggregation of the GTAP data set. There is a heavy emphasis on agriculture and food, 
comprising 13 of the 25 sectors, and a focus on the largest commodity exporters and importers. 
 
                                                 
3  For the sake of simplicity they are fixed in US$ terms at their base year level, minimizing potential 
sustainability problems; but this implies they decrease over time as a percentage of GDP for expanding 
economies. 
4   Only with fixed financial inflows from abroad can utility changes be used to provide a money-metric measure 
of welfare changes resulting from a reform. 
5   More information on the MAcMaps database is available in Bouët et al. (2004) and at 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/macmap.htm. For a detailed analysis of the differences between the results 
presented in this paper and (a) those using the Linkage model but the earlier GTAP Version 5 database, and (b) 
those using the same Version 6 database but the GTAP model, see Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 





The subsidies and import protection dataset 
 
The main source of protection is tariffs or border barriers, although some countries – 
particularly high-income countries – also have significant agricultural production and export 
subsidies. The average import tariff for agriculture and food in 2001 is 16.0 percent for high-
income countries and 17.7 percent for developing countries, while for manufactures other than 
textiles and clothing it is 8.3 percent for developing countries and just 1.3 percent for high-
income countries. The averages of course obscure large variations across countries and 
commodities. For example, if high-income countries’ tariffs on temperate farm products are at a 
near-prohibitive 100 percent but zero on tropical products such as coffee, the import-weighted 
average agricultural tariff could be quite low. Even at a relatively aggregated level, the variations 
can be quite sharp. For example, India has an average tariff in agriculture and food of 82 percent 
on imports from East Asia, but only 20 percent on imports from Sub-Saharan Africa. Also, high-
income countries’ agricultural tariffs on goods from low-income countries are lower than on 
imports from the high- and middle-income countries, while imports of textiles and clothing from 
low-income countries face a higher average tariff than imports from middle- or high-income 
countries.  
 
Estimates of welfare impact of current protection policies 
 
The LINKAGE model provides a baseline projection of the world economy first to 2005 
and then to 2015 assuming no other policy changes. Deviations from that baseline in 2015, due 
to phased partial or total liberalization from 2005, are then examined.  
One benchmark against which to measure the prospective benefits of Doha is that which 
would come from freeing merchandise trade (including removing all agricultural producer and 
export subsidies) completely over the 2005-2010 period. That leads to global gains by 2015 of 
$287 billion per year, according to the LINKAGE model. Another benchmark is the reform 
incorporated in the pre-simulation experiment for the period from 2001 to end-2004, due to the 
final stages of Uruguay Round implementation including the phase-out of the Multifibre 





enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25 members.
6 The impacts of those reforms on 
import tariffs are non-trivial. Had those three reforms not been implemented, the gains in 2015 
from freeing global merchandise trade would have been $341 billion instead of $287 billion, or 
an extra $54 billion per year. Nearly half of that difference is due to the removal of MFA  export 
quotas and hence should be considered part of the Uruguay Round’s legacy – assuming 
safeguards by high-income countries or export restraints by China do not replace textile and 
clothing quotas from 2005.
7 
Table 1 reports the distribution across regions of the standard economic welfare or real 
income (equivalent variation) effects of removing all merchandise trade distortions (including 
agricultural subsidies) globally. Of the $287 billion gain in income that reform would generate 
for the global economy per year by 2015, two-thirds would accrue to the high-income countries. 
However, as a share of national income, developing countries (as self-defined by WTO 
members) would do twice as well, with an average increase of 1.2 percent of national income 
over the baseline compared with 0.6 percent for high-income countries. The results vary widely 
across developing countries, ranging from little impact in the case of Bangladesh and Mexico to 
4 or 5 percent increases in parts of East Asia. Note in particular that Sub-Saharan Africa 
(excluding South Africa) would gain twice as much as high-income countries when expressed as 
a percentage of national income, despite the adverse change in the terms of trade for many 
African countries due in part to the loss of their non-reciprocal tariff preferences.
8  
Policy makers are frequently interested in the extent to which their gains come from their 
own liberalization relative to liberalization by their trading partners. This was estimated by 
                                                 
6   These are the key internationally agreed and bound policy changes. We do not include unilateral and unbound 
policy changes such as recent reforms in EU and US farm programs. 
7   To get a sense of how important preferences are do developing country and global welfare, we re-ran the model 
for 2001, prior to the pre-simulation experiment, without those preferences in place. The estimated global 
welfare gains from reform are then $382 billion instead of $341 billion, and the developing country gains are 
$150 billion instead of $113 billion. That is, the inclusion of preferences in the database reduces the estimated 
gains to global, developing country and high-income country welfare by 11, 25 and 2 percent, respectively. 
Much of the difference is attributable to Sub-Saharan Africa, whose reduction is almost 50 percent. The 25 (and 
especially 50) percent numbers overstate the difference for developing countries, however, for two reasons. One 
is that we assume there are no rules of origin or other impediments to developing countries fully utilizing their 
preferences. The second is that we also assume importers in the preference-providing rich countries do not use 
their power to gain a disproportionate share of the rent from that preferential access. In practice neither of these 
assumptions hold, according to recent case studies (e.g., Olarreaga and Özden 2005, Özden and Sharma 2004). 
8   This would be even more so if African reforms were accompanied by complementary domestic policy reforms 
and investments in trade-facilitating infrastructure and institutions (funds for which may be forthcoming in the 
proposed ‘aid for trade’ package that may accompany a Doha agreement – see Nielson 2006). For more detailed 





solving the model once for each region, in each case considering only liberalization by that 
region. Column 2 of Table 1 shows the total gains from multilateral liberalization while Column 
1 shows the gains that would result without liberalization by the region—that is, the gain from 
improved access to partners’ markets that Bagwell and Staiger (2002) suggest is the primary 
motivation for engaging in multilateral trade reforms. It reveals that, for regions with high 
agricultural protection (eg Western Europe, Northeast Asia, Middle East), a large proportion of 
the gain comes from own-country reform. But for many of the more-open economies, the 
majority of the gain comes from increased market access in other countries. Even in the case of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 40 percent of the gains ($1.0bn out of $2.5bn) would come from other 
regions’ reforms, despite the much-lamented losses from preference erosion in industrial-country 
markets. These results suggest that the benefits of a multilateral round could be substantially 
above the benefits available through unilateral liberalization alone.
9 
The second pair of columns in Table 1 shows the income effects of changes in the 
international terms of trade for each country. For developing countries as a group the terms of 
trade effect is negative, reducing somewhat the gains from improved efficiency of domestic 
resource use (especially in China and India).  A comparison of columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 
reveals that it is mainly own-country reform that is lowering developing countries’ terms of 
trade. Under the Armington assumption used in this model, the terms-of-trade losses are over-
estimated because no allowance is made for the expansion in the number or quality of exported 
goods resulting from reform (see Hummels and Klenow 2005). 
There are several other ways to decompose the real income gains from full global trade 
reform so as to better understand the sources of the gains for each region. One way is to assess 
the impacts of developing country liberalization versus industrial country liberalization in 
different economic sectors; another is to decompose by policy instrument. For agricultural 
reform, the latter gives results very similar to those from the GTAP-AGR model reported in 
                                                 
9   This result depends heavily on the size of the models’ Armington elasticities. Those in the Linkage model are 
about one-third larger than in the standard GTAP model on average, reflecting our focus on a longer (decade-
long) adjustment period. The Armington elasticities would have to be even larger than those in the LINKAGE 
model to get more of a WYDIWYG result (“what you do is what you get”). There is a fundamental problem 
with the Armington approach in that it assumes countries export more of the same products following 
liberalization, while Kehoe and Ruhl (2002) show that much of the expansion following liberalization is 
typically in new products, a response that reduces the adverse terms of trade impacts of export growth. 






Hertel and Keeney (2006), who estimate that market access barriers explain 93 percent of the 
welfare effects of agricultural policies, with domestic support and export subsidy removal 
contributing only 5 and 2 percentage points, respectively.
10   
Our results when decomposed by sector are provided in Table 2. They suggest global 
liberalization of agriculture and food contributes 63 percent of the total global gains (similar to 
Hertel and Keeney’s 66 percent). This is consistent with the high tariffs in agriculture and food 
(17 percent global average) versus other sectors, but is nonetheless remarkable given the low 
shares of agriculture in global GDP (4 percent) and global merchandise trade (9 percent). The 
proportion is even higher for Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than three-quarters of its welfare 
gain would come from agriculture. 
Seven-tenths of the global gains from agriculture are accounted for by the farm policies 
of high-income countries, and those policies also account for the majority of the overall gains to 
high-income countries. For developing countries, as much of their gain from farm reform would 
come from South-South agricultural liberalization as from developing countries getting 
unrestricted access to high-income country markets. That is almost equally true in manufacturing 
in aggregate, despite the big gains from textiles and clothing reform ($14 billion from market 
access in high-income countries compared with $9 billion due to South-South textiles trade 
growth). In other words, reform by developing countries is equally as important in terms of 
economic welfare gains to the South as reform by high-income countries. Notice also that 
developing country gains from high-income country reform are only half as large from textiles as 
from agricultural policies.  
What impact would the removal of cotton trade distortions and subsidies (which raise 
producer prices by more than 50 percent in the US and even more in the EU) have in this context 
of freeing all merchandise trade and agricultural subsidies? The price of cotton in international 
markets is estimated to rise on average by 21 percent above the 2015 baseline because US 
subsidies would no longer depress that price. However, the volume of US cotton exports would 
shrink when those subsidies are removed, raising the price and volume of other countries’ 
exports. In particular, cotton output and exports from Sub-Saharan Africa would be 44 and 73 
                                                 
10   Hoekman, Ng and Olarreago (2004) reach a similar conclusion from estimating the effects of halving each of 
the three types of agricultural distortions, in their case using partial equilibrium analysis. For an intuitive, non-
technical explanation of this result -- which has surprised many observers -- see Anderson, Martin and 





percent larger, respectively, under this full liberalization scenario, with the value of both the 
output and export rises being greater than for any other region including Latin America and 
Australia (where there are more other agricultural-expansion opportunities than in Africa where 
preference erosion would occur). Indeed cotton is so important in Sub-Saharan Africa minus 
South Africa that it contributes one-quarter of the region’s net gain in agricultural value added 
from full global trade and subsidy liberalization. The share of all developing countries in global 
cotton exports would be 85 percent instead of 56 percent in 2015, further vindicating the efforts 
to ensure cotton receives specific and substantial attention in the Doha negotiations (Baffes 
2005; Sumner 2006).  
The above results are for full trade liberalization. Smaller changes can be expected to 
result from partial reforms of the sort being negotiated currently under the Doha Development 
Agenda. It is to those that attention now turns. 
 
Prospective Doha scenarios: estimating their consequences 
 
The scenarios 
What will the Doha package ultimately contain?  We assume agricultural export subsidies 
are eliminated by 2013, and that domestic support for agriculture is cut in just four economies: 
by an average of 28 percent for the U.S., 18 percent for Norway, 16 percent for the EU and 10 
percent for Australia (relative to 2001 levels, as explained above). More difficult to determine 
are the likely nature and extent of reductions in market access barriers, so a number of scenarios 
are considered initially for agricultural and food products in isolation of non-agricultural tariff 
cuts, before incorporating also some non-agricultural market access.
11 Throughout this section, 
the WTO usage of the term ‘developing countries’ applies when allocating Special and 
Differential Treatment (SDT) in the form of lesser commitments to reform, which means Hong 
Kong (China), Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (China) are all able to enjoy SDT despite their 
high-income status. 
The experiments begin for Scenario 1 with a progressive or tiered reduction formula with 
marginal agricultural tariff rate reductions of 45%, 70% and 75% within each of the three bands 
                                                 
11   As suggested in the Girard Text (see WTO 2003a), we assume that in the absence of a bound tariff on a good it 





defined by the Harbinson (WTO 2003b) inflection points of tariff rates of 15 and 90 percent for 
developed countries (that is, for low agricultural tariffs the marginal rate of reduction is 45%, for 
medium-level tariffs it is 70%, and for the highest tariffs it is 75%), and for developing countries 
the reductions are 35%, 40%, 50% and 60% within each of their four bands (except least 
developed countries are not required to undertake any reduction commitments). Even these large 
cuts to bound tariffs (which are about half way between those proposed by the US and the EU in 
late 2005 in the lead-up to the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting) would lead to the average 
applied tariffs on agricultural and food products in 2015 being only one-third lower globally 
(10.0 instead of 15.2 percent) and 12.5 instead of 14.2 percent for developing countries.  
Scenario 2 examines the consequences of including “Sensitive” farm products as allowed 
for in the July Framework, with developed countries allowed to treat 2% of their HS6 
agricultural tariff lines as sensitive and, we assume, subject to just a 15 percent tariff cut
12 , and 
double those proportions of products for both developing and least developed countries, in part 
to incorporate also their demand for “Special” products treatment.
13 This would lead to the 
average agricultural tariff falling only to 13.5 percent in both high-income and developing 
countries.  
Scenario 3 considers the effects of adding to Scenario 2 a tariff cap of 200% such that 
any product with a bound tariff in excess of that limit will be subjected to a reduction down to 
that cap rate, which leads to average cuts in agricultural tariffs of 18 percent for both developed 
and developing countries. This would lead to the average agricultural tariff falling in 2015 
considerably more for high-income countries (to 11.5 percent) and but only very slightly more 
(to 13.3 percent) for developing countries. 
Scenario 4 adds to Scenario 1 the cuts in non-agricultural tariff bindings of 50 percent in 
developed countries, 33 percent in developing countries, and zero in least-developed countries. 
That lowers the average tariff on all merchandise from 2.9 percent in the baseline to 1.6 percent 
for high-income countries and from 8.4 to 7.5 percent for developing countries.  
Finally, Scenario 5 makes developing (including least-developed) countries full 
participants in the round, undertaking the same reductions in bound (but not necessarily applied) 
                                                 
12   Some proposals involve larger cuts in tariffs on these goods. 
13   As described in Jean, Laborde and Martin (2006), “Sensitive” farm products are chosen for each country by 
taking into account the importance of the product, the height of its existing tariff, and the gap between its bound 





tariffs as the developed countries in Scenario 4. That lowers the average tariff on all merchandise 
for developing countries from 8.4 to 6.8 instead of 7.5 percent, a cut of almost one-fifth in this 
case instead of just one-ninth as in Scenario 4. 
 
Estimated welfare and trade effects of those scenarios as of 2015 
The welfare consequences of implementing these various reforms over the 2005-2010 
period and allowing the global economy to adjust to 2015 are summarized in Table 3(a) in dollar 
terms and in Table 3(b) as percentage changes in real income in 2015.  
Column 1 of Table 3(a) suggests that agricultural liberalization using the harmonizing 
formula (Scenario 1) would generate a global gain of $75 billion even without the inclusion of 
non-agricultural tariff reform. But almost all those benefits accrue to the reforming high-income 
countries (with whom we include protective Korea and Taiwan (China) as well as Hong Kong 
(China) and Singapore in this and subsequent tables) such that developing countries would gain 
only $9 billion because their tariff binding overhang is so great as to lead to almost no cuts in 
their applied tariffs. Were countries allowed to have lesser cuts for even just 2 percent of their 
farm products they declare to be “Sensitive” (and another 2 percent in developing countries for 
their “Special” farm products), those global gains would shrink to just $18 billion and 
developing countries as a group would be worse off (Scenario 2). If such exceptions are to be 
made, it would be important to exploit the opportunity – provided for in the Ministerial 
Declaration – to put a cap on bound tariffs. Scenario 3 shows that even a cap as high as 200%, 
would restore at least half of the welfare gain foregone by allowing such exceptional treatment 
for “Sensitive” and “Special” farm products. 
The final two scenarios add non-agricultural tariff cuts to the agricultural reforms in the 
preceding scenarios. In scenario 4, lesser cuts are provided for developing countries’ non-
agricultural tariffs, as is the case for all the preceding agricultural cut scenarios. Even so, the gain 
to developing countries doubles by adding these non-farm reforms, relative to Scenario 1 where 
only agriculture is cut, contributing one-third of the extra boost to global welfare ($7.1 billion 
out of the $21.6 billion difference between the global gains from Scenarios 1 and 4). In Scenario 
5, the developing (including least-developed) countries fully engage in the reform process, 
foregoing the lesser cuts provided for in Scenarios 1 to 4. That boosts their and global welfare 





Nonetheless, the global average merchandise tariff hardly changes if there were just agricultural 
reform, whereas it falls by almost one-third or 1.5 percentage points when manufacturing is 
included in the reform package.   
Retaining lesser cuts for developing countries as in Scenario 4 would yield a global gain 
of $96 billion from Doha merchandise liberalization, which is a sizable one-third of what is on 
the table (the potential welfare gain from full liberalization of $287 billion, reported in Table 1). 
But for developing countries the gain would be only $16 billion, which is less than one-fifth of 
that group’s potential gain shown in Table 1 of $86 billion. If developing countries forego the 
option of reforming less than developed countries, their gain would rise by 42 percent, or an 
extra $7 billion. Much of those gains go to the largest developing economies, but note that, in 
percentage terms, Sub-Saharan Africa also gains substantially if it liberalizes more – contrary to 
the presumptions of many commentators. By contrast, in Scenario 4 the ‘Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa’ countries simply are not liberalizing enough to get sufficient efficiency gains to offset the 
terms of trade losses suffered either as net food importers, or as recipients of tariff preferences 
that have eroded with the decline in high-income countries’ MFN tariffs, or because of the 
combined export growth from reforming economies with similar export compositions.
14  
How big would be the consequences of partial reform for farm output and employment 
growth over the Doha implementation period post-2004? If there were completely free trade, 
farm output would decline (instead of growing slightly) in just the EU and Japan while growing 
slower in a few other highly protective countries – but, for most countries/regions, farming 
activities would expand. The Doha Scenario 4 would involve much less reform than a move to 
free trade, and hence a much slower loss of farm output for the EU and Japan – but also less 
output growth than under free trade for the vast majority of countries where farm output would 
be greater. For most of the protective economies, Doha Scenario 4 would simply slow the growth 
of farm output a little over the coming decade. The farm employment picture is somewhat 
different. Typically, economic growth leads to declines in not only the relative importance of 
agriculture but also in absolute numbers employed in farming once a country reaches middle-
income status. Thus it is not surprising that numerous middle- and high-income countries are 
projected to lose farm jobs over the next decade in our baseline scenario. For the most protected 
                                                 






farm sectors, that rate of farm employment decline would more than double if the world were to 
move to completely free trade; but it would increase only slightly under Doha Scenario 4. For 
most developing economies, though, farm employment would grow a little faster under that 
Doha scenario as compared with the baseline, allowing them to absorb more workers on their 
farms (Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugge 2006a, Table 12.17).
15  
How is this reflected in agricultural net income (value added by the farming sector)? 
Table 4 shows, not surprisingly, that agricultural value added would fall in those regions with the 
highest agricultural protection (Europe, Northeast Asia and to a lesser extent the US). However, 
in the Doha reform scenario none of the developing countries/regions shown in Table 4 would 
suffer a decline in agricultural net income, despite the lowering of their own agricultural tariffs. 
The reason for their farmers faring better than protected rich-country farmers – even though the 
average agricultural tariff in developing countries is nearly as high as that in high-income 
countries (14.2 percent compared with 15.9 percent in the baseline) – is because a much larger 
proportion of developing country agriculture is producing exportables that do not have to be 
protected from imports. This result has clear implications for poverty alleviation, given that 
perhaps as many as 70 percent of the world’s poor are in farm households in developing 
countries. 
The trade consequences of Doha Scenario 4 are summarized in Table 5. The first column 
shows that by 2015, annual developing country exports would be greater by $41 billion for 
agricultural products, $25 billion for textiles and clothing, and $12 billion for other 
manufactures. Their total increase of $78 billion is somewhat smaller than that for high-income 
countries ($135 billion), but that difference is less when expressed in percentage terms (a 2.6 
percent increase for developing countries, compared with 3.1 percent for high-income countries). 
This takes global merchandise trade one-fifth the way to where it would be if the move was to 
completely free trade in merchandise.
16  
                                                 
15   This finding of only small intersectoral labor movements in response to partial trade reform is consistent with 
econometric evidence of adjustments to past trade reforms (see, e.g., Wacziarg and Wallack 2004). 
16   It also raises the share of agricultural and food production that is exported globally, from 9.5 to 10.0 percent, 
which is one-seventh of the way towards its share of 13.2 percent under the free trade scenario. Even in the 
protected countries this ratio rises a little or, in the case of Europe, falls only very slightly. This is because of 
farm resources moving from currently protected import-competing sub-sectors to more-competitive farming 





Finally, of interest to those concerned that poor consumers would face higher food bills 
are the changes that might be expected in average food prices in international markets under the 
various Doha scenarios. Table 5 shows that for agriculture as a whole, prices would rise less than 
2 percent over the ten-year phase-in period. The changes could be as high as 12 percent for dairy 
products, 6 percent for cotton, and 3-4 percent for coarse grains, oilseeds, sugar and meat, but 
well under 2 percent for other farm products. Thus the annual change in basic food prices at the 
retail level would hardly be discernable even to poor consumers, thanks to the supply 
responsiveness of farmers to the increases in market access opportunities when agricultural 




Results such as those presented above are always dependent on the assumptions, data and 
parameters underlying them and so are subject to numerous qualifications. One particularly 
important qualification concerns the way preferences are treated in the Version 6 GTAP 
database. In previous versions of that database, only key reciprocal preferences were included 
(notably between members within the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN and Australia-New Zealand 
regional integration arrangements). Version 6 includes non-reciprocal tariff preferences provided 
by developed countries for their imports from developing countries under arrangements such as 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the EU’s Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
program and Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement, and the US’s Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). We have assumed that there are 
no rules of origin (ROOs) or other compliance requirements which raise the cost of utilizing 
these preferences; and we have assumed that the full benefit of the preferences flows to 
developing countries (even though developed country importers often have more market power 
than the developing country exporters of standard commodities such that the latter receives a 
smaller share of the rents).
17 We therefore overstate the extent of preference erosion that would 
                                                 
17   Evidence that the preference margin is often eroded by complex rules of origin, and that the rent is shared 
between importing and exporting countries with the latter getting less the more trade is concentrated on standard 
commodities, can be found in Olarreaga and Ozden (2005) and Ozden and Sharma (2004). A recent partial 
equilibrium study found that in practice export revenue losses from preference erosion are likely to be limited to 
a small subset of countries, primarily small island economies dependent on exports of sugar, bananas and, to a 





occur for especially least-developed countries, and so understate their gains from multilateral 
trade reform. If instead those non-reciprocal preferences were excluded from the database, we 
would overestimate the preference-receiving countries’ gains from developed country trade 
reform.
18  
Another important issue is the extent to which our model captures the supply-side 
constraints to adjustment by low-income countries to international price chances. Our elasticities 
are aimed at representing adjustment to long term changes, but are still small compared with 
those used by some other analysts (e.g., Harrison et al. 2004). Other models, including GTAP-
AGR (e.g., Hertel and Keeney 2006), use smaller trade elasticities than ours that generate smaller 
gains globally and for developing countries, with some regions (including parts of Sub-Saharan 
Africa) even losing slightly. The uncertainty about the values of these elasticities is a 
fundamental problem associated with pervasive measurement errors and uncertainty about the 
true model structure (Hummels and Klenow 2005). 
Also to be kept in mind is that global CGE models such as ours necessarily have to 
aggregate across sectors, thereby reducing the large variance in tariffs that are evident at the HS6 
or greater levels of disaggregation. Since the welfare cost of a tariff is roughly proportional to the 
square of its height, this aggregation leads to under-estimation of that cost. 
  The above analysis does not include costs of adjustment to reform, but the structural 
changes that take place over time in the normal course of economic growth are typically very 
much larger than the small changes that would accompany gradual and partial trade liberalization 
(as shown in Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006d). Furthermore, adjustment 
assistance scheme (financed by foreign aid in the case of low-income countries) are a way to 
help fund adjustment to tariff and subsidy cuts – and they are just one-off payments, whereas the 
benefits of reform continue into the future. 
Nor has this analysis taken account of the fact that trade reform typically boosts factor 
productivity and that not all sectors are subject to constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition. Most models that allow increasing returns and imperfect competition in some 
                                                 
18   The extent of overstatement would not be large though, since the difference in the low-income countries’ 
estimated benefits even from full liberalization is only $2 billion p.a. when non-reciprocal preferences are 
excluded instead of included in the LINKAGE model’s database, or $8 billion when middle-income countries are 
also included (van der Mensbrugghe 2005b). A further complication is that the ACP non-reciprocal preference 
scheme is scheduled to be replaced from 2008 with reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 





sectors generate higher gains from trade reform, although there is the possibility of the opposite 
outcome if reform induces resources to move back into an agricultural sector that has sufficiently 
fewer economies of scale than the rest of the economy.
19  
 
Implications for developing countries  
 
  The good news in this paper is that there are still large potential gains from liberalizing 
merchandise trade under Doha, with global gains of the order of $95-120 billion per year from an 
agreement consistent with the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, even if no reforms are 
forthcoming in services, , and with a disproportionately high share of that potential gain available 
for developing countries (relative to their share of the global economy). Moreover, it is the 
poorest people in developing countries that appear to be most likely to gain from global trade 
liberalization, namely farmers and unskilled laborers in developing countries.
20  
To realize that potential gain, it is in agriculture that by far the greatest cuts in bound 
tariffs and subsidies are required. However, the political sensitivity of farm support programs, 
coupled with the complexities of the measures introduced in the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture and of the modalities set out in the Ministerial Declaration, ensure the devil will be 
in the details of the final Doha agreement.  Outlawing agricultural export subsidies is the obvious 
first step. That will help bring agriculture into line with other sectors, and in the process help to 
limit the extent to which governments encourage agricultural production by other means (since it 
would remove one option for, and hence raise the cost of, surplus disposal). Concurrently, 
domestic support bindings must be cut very substantially to reduce binding overhang. Even more 
importantly, agricultural tariff bindings must be cut hugely so that some genuine market opening 
can occur. Yet allowing lesser cuts for even just a few “Sensitive” and “Special” farm products 
would reduce hugely the gains from reform, given the tariff peaks currently in place. If it turns 
out to be politically impossible not to designate some products as “Sensitive” and “Special”, the 
resulting welfare cost could be reduced by imposing a tariff cap such that any product with a 
                                                 
19   An example is the study by Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2005), whose 50 percent global reform 
scenario yields only a 0.5 percent global income gain despite economies of scale, imperfect competition and 
variety effects, and with agriculture contributing less to those gains than in the above results because farming, 
unlike other sectors, is assumed to be subject to constant returns.  





bound tariff in excess of, say, 100 percent had to reduce it to that cap rate. Expanding non-
agricultural market access at the same time as reforming agriculture would increase the prospects 
for a successful conclusion to the DDA.  
An essential part of the DDA is South-South “concessions”, especially for developing 
countries, because that is where half their potential benefits lie. That means reconsidering the 
extent to which developing countries liberalize. Since developing countries are trading so much 
more with each other now than in the 1980s, they are the major beneficiaries of reforms within 
their own regions. Even least developed countries need to consider reducing their tariff binding 
overhang at least, since doing that in the context of the Doha round gives them more scope to 
demand “concessions” (or compensation for preference erosion or other contributors to terms of 
trade deterioration) from richer countries than if they hang on to the opportunity, provided in the 
July Framework, not to engage in reform.   
What emerges from our analysis is that developing countries would not have to reform 
very much under Doha, because of the large gaps between their tariff bindings and applied rates. 
But to realize more of their potential gains from trade, they would need to commit to additional 
trade (and complementary domestic) reforms, and to invest more in trade facilitation. High-
income countries could encourage them to do so not only by being willing to open up their own 
markets more to developing country exports but also by providing more targeted aid. To that 
end, a new proposal has been put forward to reward developing country commitments to greater 
trade reform with an expansion of trade-facilitating aid, to be provided by a major expansion of 
the current Integrated Framework which is operated by a consortium of international agencies for 
least developed countries (Hoekman and Prowse 2005, Nielson 2006). This may well provide an 
attractive path for developing countries seeking to trade their way out of poverty. As well, it is 
potentially a far more efficient way for developed countries to assist people in low-income 
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Table 1: Impacts on real income from removing all global merchandise trade distortions 
(including agricultural subsidies), without and with own-country participation, by 
country/region, 2015 
(changes relative to the baseline, in 2001 dollars and percent) 
 
Real income gain p.a. 
($billion) 
That due just to 
change in terms of 
trade ($billion) 
Total gain 



















Australia and New Zealand  6.2  6.1  4.4  3.5  1.0 
EU 25 plus EFTA  40.6  65.2  29.7  0.5  0.6 
United States  21.6  16.2  18.8  10.7  0.1 
Canada  1.7  3.8  1.2  -0.3  0.4 
Japan  17.4  54.6  13.7  7.5  1.1 
Korea and Taiwan (China)  17.0  44.6  10.0  0.4  3.5 
Hong Kong (China) and Singapore  8.7  11.2  6.6  7.9  2.6 
Argentina  4.0  4.9  1.9  1.2  1.2 
Bangladesh  0.0  0.1  -0.1  -1.1  0.2 
Brazil  11.8  9.9  7.4  4.6  1.5 
China  16.6  5.6  12.5  -8.3  0.2 
India  3.9  3.4  1.3  -9.4  0.4 
Indonesia  3.6  1.9  1.5  0.2  0.7 
Thailand  9.8  7.7  3.9  0.7  3.8 
Vietnam  2.4  3.0  1.5  -0.2  5.2 
Russia  -1.0  2.7  0.2  -2.7  0.6 
Mexico  -1.2  3.6  0.9  -3.6  0.4 
South Africa  1.1  1.3  0.7  0.0  0.9 
Turkey  2.1  3.3  1.3  0.2  1.3 
Rest of South Asia  1.9  1.0  0.7  -0.8  0.5 
Rest of East Asia  2.8  5.3  1.8  -0.9  1.9 
Rest of LAC  11.8  10.3  5.3  0.0  1.2 
Rest of ECA  0.8  1.0  0.7  -1.6  0.3 
Middle East and North Africa  5.4  14.0  3.3  -6.4  1.2 
Selected SSA countries
a  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.5  1.5 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  1.0  2.5  0.9  -2.3  1.1 
Rest of the World  3.2  3.4  1.5  0.1  1.5 
High-income countries    201.6    30.3  0.6 
WTO Developing countries    141.5    -21.4 1.2 
Developing countries (World Bank def’n)    85.7    -29.7  0.8 
     Middle-income countries    69.5    -16.7  0.8 
     Low-income countries    16.2    -12.9  0.8 
     East Asia and Pacific    23.5    -8.5  0.7 
     South Asia    4.5    -11.2  0.4 
     Europe and Central Asia    7.0    -4.0  0.7 
     Middle East and North Africa    14.0    -6.4  1.2 
     Sub-Saharan Africa    4.8    -1.8  1.1 
     Latin America and the Caribbean    28.7    2.2  1.0 
World total    287.3    0.6  0.7 
a The selected Sub-Saharan African countries (for which national modules are available in the 
LINKAGE Model) include Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, 





Table 2: Regional and sectoral source of gains from full liberalization of global 
merchandise trade, developing and high-income countries, 2015 
(Change in real income in 2015 relative to baseline scenario) 
  Gains by region in $billion  Percent of regional gain  


















income  World 
          
Developing countries liberalize:          
Agriculture and food  28 19 47 33 34 35  9 17 
Textiles and clothing  9 14 23 10 12 11  7 8 
Other merchandise  6 52 58  7  1 14 26 20 
All sectors  43 85  128 50 47 60 42 45 
          
High-income countries liberalize:          
Agriculture and food  26 109 135  30  31 43 54 47 
Textiles and clothing  13 2  15  15  15 -0  1 5 
Other merchandise  4 5 9 5 7 -3  2 3 
All sectors  43 116 159  50  53 40 57 55 
          
All countries liberalize:          
Agriculture and food  54 128 182  63  65 78 64 63 
Textiles and clothing  22 16 38 25 27 11  8 14 
Other merchandise  10 57 67 12  8 11 28 23 
All sectors  86 201 287 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 
a Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to sum to 100 
percent 
 





Table 3: Change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015 
(2001 $billion and percentage changes from baseline) 
  (a) Dollar change    (b) Percentage change 
  Scen. 1  Scen. 2  Scen. 3 Scen. 4 Scen. 5   Scen. 1  Scen. 2  Scen. 3  Scen. 4  Scen. 5 
Australia & New Zealand  2.0  1.1  1.2  2.4  2.8    0.35  0.20  0.20  0.42  0.48 
EU 25 plus EFTA  29.5  10.7  10.9  31.4  35.7    0.29  0.11  0.11  0.31  0.36 
United States  3.0  2.3  2.1  4.9  6.6    0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.05 
Canada  1.4  0.5  0.4  0.9  1.0    0.15  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.11 
Japan  18.9  1.8  12.9  23.7  25.4    0.38  0.04  0.26  0.48  0.51 
Korea and Taiwan (China)  10.9  1.7  15.9  15.0  22.6    0.86  0.13  1.26  1.19  1.79 
Hong Kong and Singapore  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  1.5  2.2    -0.02  -0.03  -0.04  0.35  0.52 
Argentina  1.3 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.6    0.32 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.39 
Bangladesh  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.1  -0.1    -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09 
Brazil  3.3 1.1 1.1 3.6 3.9    0.50 0.16 0.17 0.55 0.59 
China  -0.5 -1.5 -1.1  1.7  1.6    -0.02 -0.06 -0.04  0.07  0.06 
India  0.2 0.2 0.2 2.2 3.5    0.02 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.40 
Indonesia  0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 1.2    0.05 0.07 0.01 0.37 0.44 
Thailand  0.9 0.6 0.8 2.0 2.7    0.43 0.29 0.38 0.99 1.33 
Vietnam  -0.1  0.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6    -0.20 -0.09 -0.16 -0.83 -0.97 
Russia  -0.3 -0.7 -0.7  0.8  1.5    -0.06 -0.16 -0.15  0.16  0.31 
Mexico  -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2    -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 
South  Africa  0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7    0.06 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.49 
Turkey  0.6 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.4    0.25 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.55 
Rest of South Asia  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.7    0.13  0.05  0.14  0.17  0.39 
Rest of East Asia  0.1  0.0  1.0  0.3  0.6    0.02  0.01  0.36  0.09  0.22 
Rest of LAC  3.7  0.5  0.4  3.9  4.0    0.44  0.06  0.04  0.46  0.47 
Rest of ECA  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -0.6  -0.7    -0.06  -0.09  -0.08  -0.22  -0.26 
Middle East & N. Africa  -0.8  -1.2  -1.2  -0.6  0.1    -0.07  -0.10  -0.10  -0.05  0.01 
Selected SSA countries  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.2    0.21  -0.02  -0.05  0.19  0.26 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.1  0.3    0.02  -0.13  -0.14  -0.02  0.13 
Rest of the World  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.6    0.19  0.00  0.02  0.26  0.28 
High-income  countries  65.6 18.1 43.2 79.9 96.4    0.20 0.06 0.13 0.25 0.30 
WTO  Dev.  countries  19.7  1.2 16.8 32.6 47.7    0.17 0.01 0.14 0.27 0.40 
Developing countries (WB)  9.0 -0.4  1.1 16.1 22.9    0.09 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.22 
   Middle-income countries  8.0  -0.5  1.0  12.5  17.1    0.10  -0.01 0.01 0.15 0.21 
      Low-income  countries  1.0 0.1 0.0 3.6 5.9    0.05 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.30 
   East Asia and Pacific  0.5  -0.8  0.6  4.5  5.5    0.01  -0.02 0.02 0.13 0.16 
      South  Asia  0.4 0.3 0.4 2.5 4.2    0.03 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.36 
   Europe and Central Asia  0.1  -0.9  -0.9  0.8  2.1    0.01 -0.09 -0.09  0.08  0.21 
   Middle East & N. Africa  -0.8  -1.2  -1.2  -0.6  0.1    -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05  0.01 
      Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.3 0.0  -0.1 0.4 1.2    0.06 -0.01 -0.02  0.10  0.27 
   Lat. America & the Carib.  8.1  2.3  2.1  7.9  9.2    0.29 0.08 0.08 0.29 0.33 
World  total  74.5 17.7 44.3 96.1  119.3    0.18 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.28 
 






Table 4: Impact of reform scenarios on agricultural value added, 2015 
 
(changes in value added relative to baseline, 2001 dollars and percent) 
 












Australia and New Zealand  6.4  2.4  25.6  9.8 
EU 25 plus EFTA  -39.1  -20.4  -26.4  -13.8 
United States  -18.2  -6.3  -15.0  -5.2 
Canada  3.4  0.9  23.3  5.8 
Japan  -17.7  -7.4  -39.5  -16.6 
Korea and Taiwan (China)  -9.5  -3.4  -33.3  -12.1 
Hong Kong (China) and Singapore  0.1  0.0  7.5  1.4 
Argentina 6.1  1.7  33.8  9.4 
Bangladesh -0.5  0.0  -4.4  0.4 
Brazil 15.1  5.5  46.3  16.7 
China 0.3  1.8  0.1  0.4 
India -17.1  0.4  -8.1  0.2 
Indonesia 0.8  0.5  2.7  1.7 
Thailand 3.8  1.1  25.0  7.2 
Vietnam 0.8  0.0  13.6  0.3 
Russia -1.4  -0.2  -6.5  -0.8 
Mexico 0.9  1.2  2.5  3.2 
South Africa  0.5  0.1  9.6  1.2 
Turkey -2.0  -0.1  -7.2  -0.3 
Rest of South Asia  -0.6  0.8  -1.3  1.8 
Rest of East Asia  -0.2  0.5  -0.7  1.9 
Rest of LAC  22.9  8.4  30.2  11.1 
Rest of ECA  -1.1  -0.1  -1.8  -0.2 
Middle East and North Africa  0.3  1.0  0.3  0.9 
Selected SSA countries  1.5  0.3  9.1  1.7 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  2.3  0.8  5.4  1.9 
Rest of the World  3.1  1.0  16.4  5.4 
High-income countries  -74.6  -34.2  -19.4  -8.9 
Developing countries (WB)  35.6 24.8  2.9  2.0 
   Middle-income countries  45.3  20.9  5.3  2.4 
   Low-income countries  -9.7  3.9  -2.5  1.0 
   East Asia and Pacific  5.5  3.9  1.1  0.8 
   South Asia  -18.1  1.2  -6.8  0.5 
   Europe and Central Asia  -4.5  -0.3  -4.0  -0.3 
   Middle East and North Africa  0.3  1.0  0.3  0.9 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  4.3  1.1  6.7  1.8 
   Latin America and the Caribbean  45.0  16.7  27.4  10.2 
World total  -39.0  -9.5  -2.4  -0.6 
 





Table 5: Impact of Doha reform scenarios on average international product prices, 2015 
 
(percent relative to baseline) 
 
  Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 Scen. 4 Scen. 5 
Rice  0.9 1.4 1.3 1.7  1.1 
Wheat  1.8 1.6 1.6 1.8  1.7 
Other grains  3.7 3.5 3.5 3.7  3.5 
Oilseeds  4.5 3.9 3.9 4.5  4.4 
Sugar  2.8 2.4 2.4 2.9  2.7 
Cotton  6.0 5.8 5.8 5.9  5.8 
Fruit and vegetables  1.2 0.9 0.8 1.3  1.0 
Other crops  0.9 0.5 0.5 1.2  0.8 
Vegetable oils and fats  0.7 0.6 0.6 1.0  0.8 
Livestock  0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9  0.6 
Processed meats  3.5 3.3 3.3 3.5  3.4 
Dairy products  11.8 11.8 11.8 11.7  11.8 
Other food, bev. and tobacco  0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4  0.1 
All agriculture and food  1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9  1.7 
    All primary agriculture  2.0 1.7 1.7 2.1  1.9 
    All processed agriculture  1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8  1.6 
Textile and wearing apparel  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 
 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 
 